ABSTRACT Power cyber-physical systems (PCPSs) are becoming increasingly complex and diverse, benefitting from all aspects of societal issues. A PCPS is a next-generation system that is a tight conjunction of computation, communication, control, and power systems. The integration of Internet of Things and PCPS generates a novel energy system, the Internet of Energy, which is the future of the energy system. In the same way, the connection of bulk components and the extensive communications among them has brought many insecurities, uncertainties, and security challenges. Thus, a study of the analysis and synthesis of the reliability and security of PCPS is presented in this paper. By considering the unsafe uncertainties, models are formulated for a general cyber-attack, and a double-loop architecture for security defense is designed. According to this framework, security control scenarios are obtained from the character of each kind of cyber-attack. Finally, a separately excited dc motor with uncertainty is used as an example to demonstrate the problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are an innovated system with integrated computation, communication and control capabilities for the key physical components or infrastructures of heterogeneous engineering systems. A CPS is also ubiquitous in industrial control systems, such as power systems, transportation networks, advanced manufacturing, as well as airplanes and space vehicles [1] , [2] .
Since the first international workshop held by National Science Foundation (NSF) focusing on CPS in 2006, a new round of scientific and technological competitions taking CPS as the research content is in full swing [3] . CPS, a system with a tight conjunction of physical resources and computational information, is listed as the top priority for information technology in the report of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in 2007. The U.S. National Science Foundation has provided nearly seven billion dollars for CPS research and education [1] . Furthermore, CPS has been a priority issue for the U. S. to achieve global dominance in the new round of industrial competition [3] . In 2011, the Internet of Energy was first proposed as a political decision to change the energy system in Germany. In 2013, CPS was proposed as a critical technique in Germany's Industry 4.0. At the end of 2014, the plan of ''Made in China 2025'' was established. In Japan, South Korea and the European Union, the government, industry and academia have aroused great research enthusiasm for CPS.
Based on the Internet of Things (IoT), the Internet of Energy is taken as a typical CPS system that is also called a power cyber-physical system (PCPS) [4] . The overall system spans different scales from gigawatt power plants to kilowatt distribution grids. The term ''Internet of Energy'' is proposed for the future of the energy landscape in the context of mature information and communication technologies, which play an critical role in promoting a new energy system [10] . The rapid development of techniques makes the traditional closed system progress to a larger scale, with greater distributed space and more complexity. As the critical infrastructure, the ability to generate and distribute electricity in bulk is highly regulated. It is necessary to note that energy generation and distribution are equally important.
By using advanced sensors, control and software applications, all of the energy production, transmission, consumption and hundreds of millions of pieces of equipment, machines and systems are connected to form the foundation of IoS in the Internet of Energy. Together with intelligent power generation, electricity consumption and power storage equipment will access the network, with the help of the flow of information and the formation of self-talk, the future framework of the Internet of Energy is constructed. Wang et al. [6] show that even ambient sensors for assisting living will generate and collect massive amounts of data, which will disturb the effective analysis. A white paper on Internet of Energy [5] reveals that there are 50 billion devices connected in the Internet of Energy and that even a fan within the system will generate up to 15 GB of data. Thus, the overall system will generate incredible amounts of data [9] , [11] , [15] , [19] , which is generally the provenance of insecurity for the Internet of Energy.
Moreover, the proper manufacture and distribution of electricity can directly impact our safety [8] , [12] , such as providing heat in winter or powering irrigation pumps during a drought. The smart grid is a unique facet of industrial networks that brings many new security questions and concerns into the energy industry [21] . It is an update to traditional electrical transmission and distribution systems and can accommodate digital communications for the metered and intelligent delivery of electricity.
Over the past several decades, system and control domain researchers have developed many powerful engineering methods, such as time and frequency domain methodologies, state space analysis, robust control, predictive control and game theory; see [13] , [17] , [20] , and others based on the references therein. Fruitful results have also been achieved in computer science, such as real-time computing techniques, embedded systems architectures and system software, and innovative approaches to ensure system reliability and cyber security [14] . However, the 14 greatest challenges relating environmental, health, and societal issues listed by the U.S. National Academy of Engineering have revealed that CPS research is still in its infancy. In particular, how to satisfy the high reliability and security requirements for heterogeneous physical components is the largest challenge of this research [7] , [16] .
In recent years, a great deal of incidents referring to CPS security have occurred, such as the Stuxnet virus, which destroyed the Iranian nuclear program; the breakout in Ukraine, which caused thousands of families to lose power; and the weapons-grade RansomWare called ''Wannacry'' and ''Petya'', which disabled nearly 20000 computers in governments, universities and hospitals distributed in the USA, China and Russia.
The integration of the energy landscape of tomorrow must be built on information, communication and technology (ICT), and a control infrastructure. Based on a set of open standards and protocols, all of the components of PCPS join together to form the Internet of Energy. From the theoretical control perspective, stabilization performance is considered first; stable and unstable systems are often difficult to distinguish, but this performance is insufficient to ensure the reliability and security of the system. However, system security is another strict requirement, and heterogeneous information technology (IT) techniques should be adopted. Protecting data and information via a network is the traditional mission of IT security control. However, in the control theory field, how to guarantee the stability of the system from underlying uncertain perturbations or even cyber-attacks is a more important issue. Unlike the traditional information network security, attackers aim to influence the physical device in PCPS by changing the computational information. In [21] and [22] , the dramatic differences in security between CPS and general-purpose computing systems have been summarized.
Within PCPS, the critical processes and key instruments are closely related to a hybrid combination of all new technologies [24] . Many works have focused on isolated domains, such as information disclosure [42] , denial-ofservice (DoS) [29] , wormhole attacks [43] , stealthy attack models [30] , synthesis attacks [31] and control theory, optimization and game theory approaches [27] . Recently, the setbased and event-trigger approaches have been increasingly adopted to analyze cyber-attacks (see [28] and the reference therein). In detail, an explicit characterization of the frequency and duration of DoS attacks is analyzed under the condition that the closed-loop stability is preserved in [37] .
The increasing complexity of the PCPS brings in heterogeneous uncertainties, and these uncertainties may mitigate the reliability and security of PCPS. Therefore, uncertainties generally impact system performance. In this paper, the PCPS security issue is investigated from the uncertainty perspective, and many faults and cyber-attack are taken as different uncertainties. A whole model is formulated to describe the PCPS. However, in a practice system, it is difficult to eliminate the error between the models and the practical systems, which are the so-called model errors. In addition, attack processes are often stealthy and seem normal, and the abnormal information is usually unavailable [23] , [30] .
A. CONTRIBUTIONS AND OUTLINE
The contributions of this study are as follows: (1) Security issues are considered from the fault diagnosis perspective, and the fault diagnosis approach is adopted to formulate models of a cyber-attack. (2) A cyber-attack is assumed to be the uncertainties with the control inputs, and system states and sensor outputs are employed to describe and analyze the attack. (3) Theoretical and technical scenarios are designed to defend against the cyber-attack and enhance the resiliency of the systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, four kinds of cyber-attacks are formulated by their physical features. In section III, serval meaningful results are obtained, and corresponding defense algorithms are proposed. In section IV, a separated DC motor is taken as a typical example to demonstrate the process of a cyber-attack. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are given in section V. 
II. FORMULATION A. POWER CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM (PCPS)
A PCPS can be formulated as a framework of networked control systems (NCS). between and among computing and physical entities there exists a communication channel. The framework is shown in Fig.1 . The interactions between controller and the physical (plant) within NCSs just reveals the feature of PCPS. FIGURE 1. Structure of networked control system for PCPS [26] .
Motivated by [25] , the PCPS is formulated as the model of a distributed discrete-time NCS, as shown in Fig. 1 , and the model is presented as
where
and
In another case, systems are formulated as
with
for the i th subsystem, m is the number of subsystem. Remark 1: From the mathematical model, we note that the parts AX (k), CX (k) and BU (k) in (1) are equal to the parts A X (k), C X (k) and B U (k) in (2) . However, the physical features are essentially different.
Considering one of the subsystems, the plant in NCS is formulated as
where x(k) ∈ R n p ,ũ(k) ∈ R and y(k) ∈ R n y denote the state of the plant, control signal input from controller side and measurement output of the plant, respectively. A p denotes the uncertainties of the system performance.
With the development of control theory and the widespread application of networks, security threats caused by adversaries in CPS have become an important problem to address. In this paper, uncertainties are considered not only for stabilization analyses but also for the system security performance.
Similar to [33] , a LTI feedback controller in NCSs is presented as
where The sensor outputs are presented asỹ(k) = y(k)+ y(k) with y(k) denoting the uncertainties. However, in this paper, excluding uncertainties, y(k) is also adopted to describe cyber-attacks. In particular, if a cyber-attack is absent with no system perturbation, from the theoretical perspective,
In controller equations,ỹ c (k) ∈ R n y is the reference information and includes feedback and regulation parameters. The relationship between them can be given VOLUME 6, 2018
as part of the control input to adjust the controller output against perturbations, faults and cyber-attacks.
Referring to similar methods in previous research [34] , [35] , an observer-based residual detection structure is given as
where s(k) ∈ R n s and r(k) ∈ R n r are the state of the anomaly detector and the residue between the estimator and virtual exists (normal), respectively. The combination vector is defined as
and R(k) represents the residual error of the detector.
The reference input y ref (k) is used to adjust the outputs of the controller, which can effectively eliminate the fault or attack. Remark 3: In (6), y ref (k) is specially designed to adjust the controller output, which is adopted to fight against perturbations ω(k), ν(k) and attacks u att (k), y att (k). Without losing generality, y ref (k) = J x c (k) is employed to evolve the model of (4), and D ω = I n x , D ν = I n y are defined.
Then, equation (6) is rewritten as follows:
wherē
Remark 4:
The explicit model (6) in this section is difficult to analyze theoretically. Thus, a simplification step is needed for the model. Motivated by previous research [36] , we know that the fault f (k) in the model can be taken as the combination of the actuator f a (k), plant f p (k) and sensor f s (k) faults.
In addition, uncertainties are other important elements for analyzing the fault f a (k) caused by u(k). Thus, u f (k) is taken as a part of the control signal, which is often used to denote the controller-actuator channel attack and actuator faults in a suitable sense.
for simplicity, we can easily find that x f (k) is related to u f (k) from state feedback or output feedback control law. To address this issue, we assume u f (k) = K x f (k) holds. From the state feedback or output feedback control law, we can easily determine that x f (k) is related to u f (k).
Assumption 2: Based on previous work, it is reasonable to assume that u(k) = u att (k) + u f (k) and y(k) = y att (k)+ y f (k). Then, the definition of µ(k) can be rewritten as
which is equal to the description of nonzero attack (
Consequently, the system model with faults and cyberattacks has evolved as 
T denotes all coupled perturbations, and R(k) represents the residue of the synthesis system. According to [28] , [42] , and the reference therein, the parameters uncertainties are denoted as 
Based on above definition, a mature and widespread lemma of uncertainty is presented as follow.
Lemma 1: For given appropriate dimensions matrix H and E, we have
For the considered system (9), a threshold is selected ahead, and then the judgement conditions for cyber-attack are adopted as follows:
where J r (k) denotes the real-time residual errors for the output measurements, and J th (k) is pre-selected and adjusted to control requirements.
In particular, J th (k) ≤ R is chosen as the threshold for detecting external faults and threats. In addition, the selection of R is according to control accuracy.
In control theory, the important definition of stability determination is necessary. Thus, a definition of stability based on system (9) is presented.
Definition 1: The system (9) with (k) ≡ 0 is said to be asymptotically stable (AS) by Lyapunov theory with quadratic Lyapunov function f (x) = η T (k)Pη(k), if there exists a matrix P > 0 and the inequality¯z A T P¯z A − P < 0 holds.
Definition 2: For a given parameter γ > 0, the system (9) is AS for any zero initial conditions if the following inequality holds
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY PROTECTION
Information disclosure is fundamental to several kinds of cyber-attack. Monitoring, scanning, enumeration as well as destruction, infection, and advance persistent threat (APT) [32] are effective ways for an attacker to capture information. These scenarios also help an attacker find possible bypasses or back doors to the application software. The information in NCSs is transmitted via the forward channels of the controller-to-actuator and feedback channels of the sensor-to-controller. In time k, adversarial attack scenarios can be modeled as
ϒ u (k) and ϒ y (k) are defined to describe whether the forward channel and feedback channel are secure. Thus, all the sequences of signal attackers have been obtained and can be described as
In practice, ϒ u (k), ϒ y (k) ∈ {0, 1} are the general cases, where ''1'' represents that both the signal transmission and reception processes are successful; otherwise, ''0'' indicates a failure of transmission and reception. Furthermore, α = diag{α i , α j } and β = diag{β i , β j } can be defined as the probability of transmission data over the forward and feedback transmission channels, respectively. Consequently, the models evolved as follows:
where {α i , α j , β i , β j } ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of a successful attack in the forward and feedback channels, which are often defined as follows:
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Generally, resource disclosure is the first step of an attack action, which is also the first indication that the system is under attack. During this process, an adversary may capture the system model information to determine the input control signals, feedback output signals, and even the relationship of the parameters in the system such that an attacker can utilize this information to plan attack actions. Therefore, it is critical to determine whether the attacker can be discovered.
C. DoS ATTACK VERSUS PACKET LOSS
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks prevent legitimate users from accessing a specific network resource, and the first work on this issue began in the 1980s. The distributed denialof-service (DDoS) attack incident was first reported [44] . Because CPS is full of distributed information interactions (see [37] and the references therein), it is very important to prevent and effectively defend against DDoS attacks. To facilitate the analysis, the following definitions of DoS are given.
Definition 3: For a given closed-loop system, u and y are the control and sensor output sequences, respectively. Stacking them as = diag{ u , y }, with u ∈ R n u , y ∈ R n y , the models for DoS can be constructed as
By checking the values of U k DoS and Y k DoS , it can be determined when and which physical signals are suffering a DoS attack.
In [k 0 , k m ], with 0 ≤ k 0 < k m , the DoS presence and absent interval can be generalized as
In addition, two meaningful conclusions can be drawn: In a sense, DoS and packet loss exhibit almost the same characteristics for a given length of time. To find out the differences between DoS and traditional packet loss, EDDT with different lengths should be analyzed in details.
The parameters S PL , S ET , and S ET +PC are defined to denote the maximum allowable upper bound for packet loss, the maximum time interval allowed for event triggering and the maximum effective prediction sequence length under the event-triggering scheme, respectively. Further, 0 < S PL < S ET < S ET +PC and S ETS+PC is needed for different control objections.
The maximum EDDT is I i , defined as
, traditional methods for packet loss can be adopted to address this kind DoS; otherwise, if I i ∈ S 2 = [S PL , S ET ), the well-studied tool of the event-trigger scheme can be employed to mitigate the effect of DoS. If I i ∈ S 3 = [S ET , S ET +PC ), both eventtrigger predictive control approaches can be applied together to defend against a long-duration DoS to ensure the reliability and security of CPS. Otherwise, human action should be implemented to protect the system and critical fundamentals.
D. STEALTH/COVERT ATTACK
Stealth attacks are more sophisticated than other kinds of attacks. This kind attack aims to inject false data and remain undetectable, of which man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are the most typical. Based on the information disclosed, attackers can make full use of the captured system information and then utilize the key-information to attack the system stealthy. Since they have almost full knowledge of the system, they not only enact a successful attack but also hide themselves well. Therefore, this case requires more sophisticated resources and more plant knowledge to find and defend against [30] . Meanwhile, the tradeoffs between utility and delectability should be considered as well.
Considering this type of cyber-attack, NCS in (1) can be rewritten as
whereũ(k) denotes the control input from controller transmitted via the network andũ c (k) = Kx(k) is the state feedback control law. For a linear case, it is represented asũ c (k) = u c (k) + u att (k), where u att (k) is usually taken as a cyberattack in the controller-to-sensor channel.
Combining the two equations in (13), we obtain the following according to equation (2):
Remark 7: On the one hand, for a normal case, u att (k) = 0, y att (k) = 0 and, thus,ũ c (k) = u c (k), y p−c (k) = y p (k); then, equations (13) and (15) can be used reduce to NCS (1) and (2) . On the other hand, the system security is lost, which means µ(k) = 0, y att (k) = 0 and
Combining (13) − (15) gives, in the nominal case, the closed-loop response of the system as
In the presence of a stealth attack or covert agent, the control signal u(k) is effected as u(k)+ u att (k), and the feedback signal of the sensor-to-controller is y p (k) + y att (k).
Since the attacker has been learning and imitating the original system, the model of the attacker can be formulated similarly to the original system as
where µ , u and ref are the matrices that must be determined and adjusted according to the learning errors. This feedback loop is driven by the y ref (k) input, giving
According to (14) and (15)
c (k) is ideal, which indicates that the error between the virtual system and covert agent is zero and that the attacker has learned and mastered the original system.
E. REPLAY ATTACK (RA)
Replay attacks act by recording the history information of the control inputs or sensor measurement outputs and then inject the recorded data into the actuator or controller to disturb the steady state of either the plant or the controller to make wrong decisions.
In the actual process, a replay attack does not work alone because another program or attack behavior is required to complete its own attacks. At first, it attacks by monitoring the network or using other means to steal authentication credentials, usually cookies or an authentication session, and then returns this information to the authentication server.
The replay attack is very strong, although the encryption method can effectively prevent the plain text from being monitored, but it cannot prevent replay attacks because the attack process can be carried out by using the cipher text alone.
Based on the framework presented in Fig. 3 , the sequence in the field of information security, the conventional solution is to use a ''challenge response'', time stamp, serial number and other methods. In the field of control theory, the χ 2 distribution, a physical watermark detection method for detecting replay attacks, has gradually become a mainstream method; see [38] - [40] and the reference therein.
Before analysis for the replay attack, an important definition is given as follow.
Definition 5: CPS has been exposed to information disclosure or infected by a virus program, while the attackers obtain the system information only, they do not act any attack strategy that has a disruptive effect on the system, which is called latency. The attacker obtains all control information and sequence information of the feedback information in this latency period and it is called a complete latency period.
During the interval [t k , t k+1 ), the attacker records the original information of the system including input and output sequences, then replay them at t k + s, s > t k+1 − t k = T . In particular, in order to avoid been detected, the points
Such that, the iteration process of RA is presented as
for forward and feedback channels. X a () and Y a () denote the state and output signals that have been attacked. The errors between neighboring security states/output is denoted as
In order to ensure the stability of the system, T is assumed to be under a certain upper bound.
Select a control sequence of length h and output sequence data as contrast sequences, which can be represented as
The length value h is the experience value, which can be adjusted. When the same sequence as the contrast sequence data is detected, bidirectional expansion will be carried out based on the two ends of the contrast sequence, respectively. This scenario called ''dynamic windows,'' which is effective for replay attack detection.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Before giving the main results, two significant assumptions are presented that will play important roles in deducing the main results.
Assumption 3: The attacker can learn the system model well. Therefore, he clearly knows the rules between the inputs and outputs of the system plant. For example, the input-output VOLUME 6, 2018 (k). Since the CA attacker has full knowledge of the plant, together with the ability of listening the communication channels between sensor and controller, thus it can remove the effects. When the parts of the controller side received the sequence¯ p (k), conditions (I), (II), and (III) alert the users to the existence of the CA attacker.
Remark 9: First, because the hash function has one-way features, the attacker cannot parse the original message from the hash values. Second, if the hash function is determined, the hash value will be same for the same information. Finally, the industrial system is always functionally periodic, and the sampled data follow certain operating rules, which ensure that the historical database is healthy and trustable.
In order to describe the design philosophy of defense scenarios clearly, a flow chart is given in Fig.4 . 
IV. EXAMPLES
A. EXAMPLE 1 In this section, a well-known example of DC motor speed regulation presented to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed approach. The system diagram can be expressed in Fig. 5 .
Due to the previous adjustable speed performance in a wide range, DC motors have been widely used in industrial systems. Although these motors have nonlinear characters in performance, the magnetization curve is considered linear in practice. The armature voltage u a is generally formulated as
where φ is the pole flux, which has a hysteretic nonlinearity. In the virtual case, it is usually operated in the linear region for simplicity as φ = L f i f . The field voltage u f is formulated by the equation
The electric torque generated by the motor is calculated with the following equation:
This is a static torque. Because most DC motors run under load mode, the dynamic torque should be considered, and it is formulated as
where T L is the mechanical load torque, which is often taken as the unmeasured load disturbance torque. The parameter notations in above equations are given in Table 2 together with example values. 
H. Ge, Z. Zhao: Security Analysis of Energy Internet With Robust Control Approaches and Defense Design Similar to [41] , we define the system state as
According to above definitions, the DC dynamic model can be given aṡ (27) where
The obvious relationship of uncertainties and the normal parameters is R a = R a normal + R a , R f = R f normal + R f , and T L = T L normal + T L . Furthermore, the control input is presented as u a (t) = u a normal (t) + u a (t), which is usually neglected. However, because of its important influence to the system, it has been reconsidered in many recent publications.
The uncertainties are often caused by the armature and field resistance as well as the load torque. Hence, R a , R f and T L are used to denote the errors from the nominal values. From recent studies, we find that the uncertainties u a (t) are generally caused by cyber-attacks. Based on above description, we have where the parameter uncertainties are often decomposed as A = HF(t)E and H and E are known real constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. Meanwhile, F(t) is an unknown matrix, which satisfies F(t)F T (t) ≤ I . In this study, the static state feedback controller is designed as u(t) = −Kx(t) = − k 1 k 2 k 3 x(t) (28) According to the robust controller design theory ( [41] and the references therein), the above controller can be obtained using the [42, Lemma 2.5 ] to obtain a symmetric definite matrix P. The system parameters are same as those of [41] such that K = 0.37265 1.1029 −8.0814 can be borrowed for simulation works.
The parameter uncertainties are varying with ±10% of the normal uncertainties; thus, we have the red line denotes the abnormal case. In the sophisticated method of [30] , the speed decline cannot be detected easily. How to guarantee the detectable of the varying of the parameters, especially for critical parameters, requires further study. Fig. 7 shows the speed errors between the normal and abnormal cases of the DC motor. After the unstable initial process, the errors caused by an uncertain attack are limited in the span of 0 − 200r/min and greater than 10% of the rated speed.
V. CONCLUSION
Serial main cyber-attack have been analyzed from the uncertainty perspective. From the analysis, we realized that modeling errors, actuator faults, sensor faults, and even the typical cyber-attack -stealth attacks, covert attacks and denial-of-service -can be formulated in a united form. This is also the main contribution of this paper. To eliminate these attacks, a double closed-loop structure is designed for attack defense. This is another contribution of our work.
